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ABSTRACT
Cost Management Preferences 
of Small Restaurant Firms
by
Heesim (Amy) Kim
Dr. Michael Dalbor, Examinadon Committee Chair 
Processor of Hotel Administration 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The purpose of this study is to test cost management preferences of small restaurant 
6rms. It attempts to identify v tether managers of small restaurant 6rms behave 
diSerently depending on the level of conflict as noted by agency theory and expense 
preference theory.
Data hom 87 private small restaurant Grms were used. Cost of doing business, size of 
staff and hve accounting ratios (ROE, ROA, Profit Margin, Financial Leverage and Asset 
Utilization) were used as dependent variables. Three independent variables, type of 
management, family-owned factor and ownership percentage were used as the sources of 
variance. The results 6om the analysis of variance and linear regression show support for 
the research hypotheses that small restaurant hrms are operated diSerently depending on 
the level of conflict
m
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of the Study
The major purpose of this paper is to test cost management preferences of restaurant 
Gims usiog agency theory. It is expected that costs are controlled diGerently by 
managas depending on the degree of conflict between the agent (managers) and the 
principal(s) (owners).
Background of the study 
The collapse of Enron (NYSE: ENE), once the seventh largest Grm in America, is 
known as the largest corporate failure ever, throwing thousands of employees out of work 
and leaving Gieir retirement accounts worthless. This incident not only caused investors 
to lose billions of dollars but also raised quesGons about business ethics, which will 
continue to affect overall investor conGdence. Given the complexity of this case, many 
diGerent issues and problems such as accounting pracGces, poliGcal influence, and 
business ethics have been raised and are currently being invesGgated. However, among 
the many core reasons that contribute to this chaos, it can be said that the "conflict of 
interest" issue between managers and owners played a major role in the company's 
failure.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The issue of conflict between manag«"s and owners has been examined by numerous 
studies in previous literature based on what is called agaicy theory, discussed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), an agency relationship 
is deGned as a contractual relaGonship under which one or more persons (the principal) 
engages another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf  ̂which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agenL In this relaGonship the 
"conflict of interest" between managers and owners arises due to the Gict that Giere is a 
separaGon between ownership and maoagonent. Under the behavioral assumpGon that 
all individuals are assumed to choose acGons that maximize their own personal wel&re, 
there is good reason to believe that the agent (manager) will not always act in the best 
interests of the principal (owner/shareholders).
Many ways have been proposed to miGgate the conflict that occurs in this 
relaGonship. One of the popular ways that has been suggested is to increase the 
proporGons of stocks owned by managers. Hence, many studies (RozeG  ̂1982; Kim & 
Sorensen, 1986; Morck et al., 1988; Kim et al., 1988; Hudson et al., 1992; Gu & Qian, 
1999) relating managerial ownership and company performance have been completed 
with some studies finding a signiGcant relaGonship and others not Gnding that result
The idea of testing the relaGonship between managenal ownership (usually measured 
by the percentage of stock held by management) and company performances (usually 
measured by stock return, dividend policy, and accounting raGos) is to test the hypothesis 
that managerial ownership will have a posiGve relaGonship with company performance 
because increasing managerial ownership is expected to play a posiGve role in miGgating 
the conflict (mangers will act like owners). This ownership will therefore reduce agency
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
cost, which will, in turn, lower the degree of potential decrease in Grm value. However, 
the majonty of the literature, vdiich focuses on the relationship between the level of 
monitorii^ (for example, number of board meetings) or incenGves (for example, stock 
opGons, CEO compensaGon, performance plans and so forth.) and how this afkcts 
company performance (for example, dividend policy, proGt raGos, stock prices) only 
provides indirect evidence of the existence of the relationship. These researchers mainly 
focused on examining the overall existence of the agency relaGonship between the agent 
and the owner, rather Gian focusing on which Grm level variables are controGed 
diSerenGy by managers or how much the actual agency costs are. This is because there 
is no public company that is 100 percent owned and managed by one person. The use of
Giese data limits the complete comparison between every level of ownership structure in
■
which a Grm is 100 percent owned and managed by a single individual (no agency cost 
occurs) and in vhich a Grm is operated by a manager with no equity in the Grm 
(manager's pay is completely independent of Grm performance) and the performance of 
these Grms. This explains why the actual measurement of the principal variable of 
interest and agency costs has lagged behind (Ang et al., 2000). As Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) noted in their paper, only in the case where a Grm is 100 percent owned and 
managed by a person will there be no agency costs.
Different Gom previous research, this paper will attempt to identify the direct Grm 
level cost variables, which are assumed to be controlled differenüy by managers 
depending on their ownership structure. The major intenGon of this paper is to identify 
the actual decision-making behavior of the managers of diGerent ownership structures 
rather than testing the overall existence of the agency relaGonship. In order to carry this
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out, this p^ier wül use non-publicly traded small company data, Wiich are provided by 
the Federal Reserve Board in their "1998 Survey of Small Business Finances," especially 
focusing on restaurant Grms. These data provide diGerent ownership structure companies 
Gom 100 percent owner-managed company to Grms operated by mangers with no equity 
and various ownership cases in between; therefore it will make it possible to clearly 
discover which variables are treated difkrenGy by managers depending on the level of 
conGicL The variables tested will be based on Gnancial statement infbrmaGon, which is 
the initial source of measuring company performance. The selecGon of the variables wiU 
be supported by past literature, which will be introduced in Chapter 2.
ContribuGons of the Study
Although many studies have empincally tested the relaGonship between managenal 
ownership and company performance, the results are inconclusive. Some studies (Kim et 
al., 1988; Hudson et al., 1992) have found a sigiGGcant relaGonship, whereas others 
(RozeG  ̂1982; Tsetsekos & DeFusco, 1990) have failed to identify this relaGonship. By 
providing addiGonal empincal evidence, this study will also contribute to identifying the 
agency relaGonship focusing on the Grm's manager and owner relaGonship.
As menGoned above, the m ^onty of the existing literature has focused on testing 
agency theory by examining the effects of monitoring or incenGves on the value of the 
Grm and therefore, only implying the existence of the relaGonship rather than calculating 
the actual agency cost or identifying the actual variables that are controlled differenGy 
depending on the level of conflict between the agent and the principal. In this study, the 
attempt to identify the actual variables will not only provide more direct evidence of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
relationship but also, by using private small company data, it will contribute in 
identifying some of the firm level variables which are controlled differenGy depending on 
managerial ownership structure. Identifying these variables will help recognize the 
decision-making behavior of managers of different ownership structures.
Despite the expansion of the mulG-unit chain restaurants, it is a well-known 6ct that 
Gie restaurant industry is still dominated by the mom-and-pop independent restaurants. 
Accordh% to Gie 1995 Department of Commerce's Census, siigle-establishment 
restaurants make up 62 percent of the total number of restaurants in the United States 
(U.S.). By using data of non-publicly traded small restaurant Grms, this study will add 
onpirical evidence to the agency theory Gterature for the majority of these small 
restaurant Grms in the U.S.
Limitations of the Study
The fbllowii^ are some of the m ^or limitaGons associated vdth this study:
1. Accuracy of this study is limited by the use of secondary data;
2. Due to the size of the available samples, important factors such as type of 
organizaGon, capital structure, and/or method of accounting, and so Grth are not 
considered in this study;
3. Only pnvately held companies are included in the study and therefore, results 
may not be applicable to publicly traded companies;
4. The variables tested are also limited by the availability of the data provided;
5. The source of measurement error can occur due to the poor record-keeping 
typical of small business and the tendency of small-business owners to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
exercise Gexibility with respect to certain cost items (k r exanq)le, 
raising/lowering expenses) (Ang et al., 2000); and,
6. The variables tested in the study only Meus on Grm level variables, which are 
assumed to be directly controlled by managers.
DeGniGon of Terms 
The terms used in this study are listed below.
1. Agency RelaGonship:
A contract under which one or more persons (the principal[s]) oigage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf vhich involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent
2. InteracGon:
In analysis-of-variance, a joint effect of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable.
3. MainEfkct:
In analysis-of-variance, this is the efkct o f each of the individual factors, 
ignoring the other factors.
4. Other Income:
This term refers to any other business income the Grm may have had that was 
not included in sales or gross receipts, such as federal or state gasoline tax 
refunds or fuel tax credit or refunds.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5. Outside-manager Grm:
A Grm in which an outside paid manager is responsible Mr day-to-day 
operation of the Grm.
6. Owner-manager Grm:
A Grm in vdiich the primary owner is responsible Mr day-to-day operation of the 
Grm.
7. Primary owner:
The owner who has the largest ownership share and Gill Gnancial decision­
making authority.
8. Return on Assets (ROA):
Indicator of proGtabihty that is determined by dividing net income Mr the past 
12 monMs by Mtal average assets. The result is shown as a percentage. ROA can 
be decomposed into return on sales (net income/sales) mulGplied by asset 
utilization (sales/assets).
9. Return on Equity (ROE):
This indicator of proGtability is determined by dividing net income Mr the past 
12 months by common stockholder equity (adjusted Mr stock splits). The 
result is shown as a percentage. Investors use ROE as a measure of how a 
company is using its money.
ROE may be decomposed inM ROA mulGplied by Gnancial leverage (total 
assets/total equity).
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10. Small Restaurant Firms:
A group of Grms deGned by primary SIC code 58 as commercial establishments 
primarily engaged in the retail sales of prepared food and drinks for on-premise 
or immediate consumpGon, which have fewer than 500 employees.
11. Total Cost of Doing Business:
This cost is the sum of "cost o f goods sold" and "selling and admirnstraGve 
expenses." The cost of goods sold is the cost of purchasing materials and the 
costs associated with preparing goods for sale during the last accounting year. 
These costs include direct labor costs, cost of materials used to make the goods or 
provide service and overhead costs (such as supervisory costs, suppGes, indirect 
labor costs). Selling and administraGve expenses are addiGonal expenses that can 
be incurred in operating a business. Examples of these expenses are rent or 
property tax, insurance and depreciaGon of MciliGes, and interest paid on bonds, 
notes and other loans.
12. Total Sales:
The amount is reMrred to as total sales less amount of returned merchandise.
Chapter Summary
This chzgrter introduced the purpose of the study along with limitaGons and 
contribuGons of the study. Terminologies used in the study were also introduced. In the 
next chapter, two major theones, agency theory and expense preference theory will be 
introduced.
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CHAPTER!
LITERATURE REVIEW 
IntroducGon
As mentioned in chuter one, much of the relevant literature idenGGes the existence 
of agency relaGonships by examining the relaGonship between morntoring/incoiGves and 
company performance. In chfgyter two, the Gterature examining the iniGal confGict 
between the agent and the owner wiG be discussed. Two theones wiH be introduced. 
First, overaG agency theory wiG be examined. Second, expense-preference theory, vdGch 
wiG be used to support the selecGon of cost variables, wiG be discussed. FinaGy, studies 
of agency theory and issues in the restaurant industry wiG be introduced.
The Firm and Agency Theory 
In order to understand the agency theory, it is necessary to Grst study the basic 
concept of the Grm, since it serves as the basic setting for many agency relaGonships. In 
this secGon agency theory vyiG be examined by discussing the following matters: 1) the 
deGniGon of the Grm; 2) agency theory and contracting; 3) the potential agency problems 
and the cost that occurs Gom agency relaGonship; and, 4) ways to miGgate the conGict 
and past empirical evidence.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The Concept of the Firm 
DeGning the concept of the Grm plays a large role in the study of agency relationship 
because this concept serves as die nexus of the agency relationships among the various 
participants within the Grm. One of the earhest efMrts in deGning the concept of a Grm 
was done by Coase (1937). In his paper called "The Nature of the Firmi," the idea of a 
Grm was based on the economic idea of "subsGtuGon at the margin." It was ass«ted by 
the author that Grms exist because there is a related cost, using the price mechanism, by 
vhich resources are allocated in the econonuc system. In other words, some of the costs 
that occur in a separate contract for each exchange transacGon, which takes place on a 
market, can be saved by forming an orgarGzaGon (a Grm) and allowing some authority to 
direct the resources (Coase, 1937).
Building on this work, a papo^ by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) deGnes a Grm as a 
contractual structure with joint ir^ut(s) or team producGon. It was noted in their p^)er 
that contractual structure arises as a means of enhancing efhcient orgarGzaGon, joint 
input(s), or team producGotL Because it is possible to increase producGvity through 
team-onented producGon and it is economical to estimate marginal producGvity, this 
possibility leads to the contractual organizaGon of inputs, known as classical capitalist 
Grms (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).
Similar to the deGrGGon of Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
also deGned a Grm based on the contracting relaGonship. The difkrence was that Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) broadened their deGrGGon by expanding this relaGonship beyond 
the joint producGon or team producGon to contracting relaGonships among individuals 
(employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and so on.). It is noted in their paper that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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most organizations are simply legal Actions, which serve as a nexus for a set of 
contracting relationships among individuals. These relationships include Arms, non-proAt 
institutions and foundations, mutual organizations and insurance companies and co­
operatives, some private clubs, and even governmental bodies (Jensen & Meckling,
1976).
It is clear Aom these deAniGons that a "Arm" (orgarGzaGon) is a complex set of 
contractual relaGonships between individuals, mainly to decrease transacGonal costs or 
increase producGvity, thereby maximizing proAt. From this contractual relaGonship 
arises the relaGrmship and conflict between the principal (owner) and the agent 
(manager).
Aeencv Theory and ContracGne 
Before examining agency relaGonships in detail, there is a need to examine the pnor 
reason why the principal (owner) does not manage the Arm alone but instead hires 
individuals (agents). In other words, why are all Arms not owner-managed? According 
to Jensen and Meckling (1976) if a wholly owned Arm is managed by the owner, he will 
make operating decisions that maxirrGze his utility. However, if Gie owner-manager sells 
equity claims on the corporaGons, which are idenGcal to his own, agency costs will be 
generated by the divergence between his interest and those o f the outside shareholders, 
since he will then bear oiGy a AacGon of Gie costs of any non-pecuniary beneAts he takes 
out in maximizing his own utility (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The pnce the shareholders 
pay for shares will reAect the moiGtoring costs and the effect of the divergence between 
the manager's interest and theirs. Nevertheless, the owner wiU And it desirable to bear 
these costs, as long as the welfare beneAt he experiences Aom converting his claim on the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Ann into general purchasing power is large enough to ofEset the cost (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).
This relaGonship exists in all organizaGons between managers and owners, 
shareholders and bondholders, between suppGers, employees, customers, and in all 
cooperaGve efforts at every level of management in Arms. AddiGonally, the relaGonship 
exists in uinversiGes, mutual companies, cooperaGves, governmental authoriGes and 
bureaus, unions, and relaGonships normally classiAed as agency relaGonships such as 
those common in the performing arts and the market Mr real estate (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).
The basic conflict between the two parGes exists because as utility maximizers, there 
is good reason M believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The confAct that arises in this contractual 
relaGonship is based upon the assumpGon that all individuals are assumed to choose 
acGons that maximize their own personal welfare (Bamea et al., 1985). An example of 
this conAict may be that of debtholders (principal) and the stockholders (agent). A Arm 
that has debt outstanding may have the incenGve to undertake relaGvely high-risk (xqrital 
investment projects, even though such projects may reduce the overall market value of 
the Arms. This situaGon is defined as the problem of "asset subsGtuGon" where the 
stockholders o f a corporaGon will prefer projects that enhance their own wealth and they 
may select projects adverse to the interests of the Arm's debtholders (Emery & Finnerty,
1991).
Another example of this basic conflict can be the relaGonship of stockholders 
(principals) and managers (agents). As menGoned in the work of Alchian and Demsetz
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(1972), some employees want to get paid without having to put forth effort This 
problem of an agent putting forth less than full effort is referred to as "shirking." The 
problems that occur Aom this relaGonship are further examined below. However, 
although there are many agency relaGonships, it should be noted that this paper focuses 
mainly on the problems that occur between the manager (agent) and the owner (principal) 
of a company. The reason is Giat the delegaGon of decision-making authority is an 
essenGal feature of the modem corporaGon (Bamea et al., 1985) and the relaGonship 
between the stockholders (owners) and the managers (agents) of a corporaGon Ats the 
deAoiGon of a pure agency relaGonship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Problems That Occur Aom Aeencv RelaGonship and Its Costs 
Several problems can occur in the relaGonship between the agent and the principal. 
As menGoned earlier, the basic assumpGon is Giat Gie agent will not always act to 
maximize the welfare of the principal. One of the major problems is called the moral 
hazard problem. The problem of moral hazard arises whenever the agent has the ability 
to take unobserved self-interested acGons that are cosGy to the principal. These acGons 
include direct beneAts, such as the personal use of a company car or personal side trips 
on company travel, and indirect beneAts such as an up-to-date ofBce décor. Thus, the 
stockholders will suffer a loss in theA residual claim Aom these acGons. Another 
problem that arises Aom this relaGonship is infbrmaGon asymmetry. This problem arises 
because one party possesses more infbrmaGon than the other due to then posiGon. For 
example, because managers control the Arm on a day-to-day perfbrmance, they are the 
ones who posses the most inMrmaGon concerning the Arm's perfbrmance (accounting 
infbrmaGon/audit). Most of this infbrmaGon is not given to the investors. Therefbre, a
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conflict arises between the new investors and existing stockholders. Other potential 
agency problems include the impact of bankruptcy on stockholders as opposed to 
employees and under-investment
In most of these agency relationships a cost is incurred due to the divergence between 
the agent's decisions and those decisions that beneAt the principal. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) deAned this cost as the dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced 
by the principal as a result of this divergaice and refer to this as the "residual loss." 
Monitoring costs are also incurred to limit the acAviAes of the agenL In addiAon, 
bonding costs are needed to guarantee that the agent will not take certain acAons that 
would harm the principal. Overall, the authors deAne the agency cost as the sum oA 1) 
the monitoring expenditures by the principals; 2) the bonding expenditures by the agent; 
and 3) the residual loss. These costs will eventually lead to the decrease in Arm value.
Wavs to Mitigate This Conflict and Past Empirical Evidence 
Many studies have proposed ways to miAgate the conflict between the agent 
(manager) and the priiKâpal (owner). Alchian and Demsetz (1972) asserted that the 
contractual structure arises as a means of enhancing efAcient organizaGon of team 
producGon. Thus, the ability to detect shirking among owners ofjoinGy used inputs in 
team producGon is enhanced by this arrangement (detecGon costs are reduced) and the 
discipline (by revision of contracts) of input owners (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).
Another simple way to miGgate this conflict is to strengthen monitoring and bonding 
acGviGes. This process may include auditing, formal control systems, budget restncGons, 
and incenGve compensaGon systems (Kim, 1998). A major method proposed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) included increasing managenal stock ownership or the proporGons
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of stocks owned by the management This method of miGgating agency problems has 
been examined by researchers (Rozeff, 1982; Kim & Sorensen, 1986; Morck et al., 1988; 
Kim et aL, 1988; H nd^n et al., 1992; Gn and Qian, 1999) in difkrent industries and by 
using difkrent company performance measurements.
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976) Grst discussed the relaGonship between agency 
costs and Gie degree of inside ownership, many studies have examined how managerial 
behavior difkrs with the degree of inside ownership. Some researchers (Rozeff, 1982; 
Kim & Sorensen, 1986) examined insider ownership and corporate policy regarding debt 
and dividends and found that low insider ownership Grms are managed difkrenGy Aom 
h%h insider ownership Grms (Kim et al., 1988). Others (Kim et al., 1988; Hudson et al.,
1992) researched the relaGonship between insider ownership and security/stock returns 
and found that, on averzge, stock issued by corporaGons with high insider ownership 
tends to ouQierAmn that of low insider ownership Grms (Kim et al., 1988). Also using 
the Eamings/Price raGo and considering the size effect, it was kund that Grms with 
higher inside ownership had higher return, but there was an inverse relaGonship between 
size and return (Hudson etal., 1992).
In the hospitality literature Gu and Qian (1998) examined the relaGonship between 
managerial ownership and Grm perfbrmance in the U.S. hotel industry using Gve 
accounting raGos (return on assets, return on investment, return on equity, proGt margin, 
and operating return) and stock return. For both casino and regular hotels combined, 
managerial ownership was staGsGcally signiGcant fbr proGt margin, operating return, and 
return on equity.
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A previous thesis (Kim, 1998) also measured perfbrmance of U.S. restaurants using 
seven accounting ratios (total asset turnover, operating efGciency ratio, net proGt margin, 
operating return, return on assets, return on equity, and return on investment).
Examining whether the impact of managerial ownership on Grm perfbrmance is difkrent 
in one group than others, the author fbund that the signiGcance level declined as the 
managerial ownership level increased (Kim, 1998).
As can be seen from the above studies, the majority of the literature that attempts to 
test the agency Gieory has fbcused on how monitoring and/or incenGves miGgate this 
conflict, which, in turn, will decrease agency cost, and therefbre, reduce the extent of the 
decrease of Grm value. Until recenGy, not much research has been done to idenGfy 
which variables are actually controlled differently by managers of difkrent ownership 
share and how much the actual agency cost is. However, Ang et al. (2000) provided 
evidence to measure the actual agency cost using 1,708 small non-pubhcly traded 
corporaGons from the NSSBF data base and fbund that agency costs are signiGcanGy 
higher when an outsider rather than an insider manages the Grms and are inversely related 
to the manager's ownership share. In addiGon, the authors fbund that agency costs 
increase with the number of nonmanager shareholders. The authors menGoned in their 
paper that the above Gndings were possible because of the infbrmaGon about the sole 
owner-manager Grms, where the Grm is 100 percent owned and managed with no outside 
equity obtained through the database.
In the fbllowing secGon, expense preference theory, which will be used as evidence in 
selecting the variables controlled differenGy based on difkrent ownership share, will be 
examined. These variables will be later used to determine the signiGcant variables. The
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it%iuiLainyx;w)ction{ff(dia{)ter1\vois oi^anized as follows: 1) Expense preference ±eory 
and past literature will be introduced; 2) the variables suggested by expense pre&rence 
theory will be analyzed; and 3) some characteristics about small restaurant businesses 
will be analyzed.
IbqxnseIhe6%enoeTbeory 
The basic behavioral assumption that underlies the agency theory is that all 
individuals are assumed to choose actions that maximize their own personal welfare and 
that agency relationship occurs when thae is a separation between ownership and control 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These two assunqrtions are the same &r a theory called the 
expense pre6rence theory, whuansioiarwagfaireiü doesi&ot have a neutral attitude towards 
costs, as developed by Williamson (1963). Erqpcnse preference theory is one of the 
postclassical substitute theories that attack the standard assumption of profit 
maximization (Hannan & Mavinga, 1980). It is commonly described in the industrial 
organization literature maintaining that management in which ownership is separate from 
control will employ an input mix that deviates 6om the cost-minimizing input mix (Dor 
et al, 1997). In other words, "expense preference" refers to the tendency of managers to 
spend more on perquisites than profit maximizing would dictate (Carter, 1991). 
Williamson (1963), in his paper, "Managerial discretion and business behavior," explains 
that management does not have a neutral attitude towards costs. He asserts that directly 
or indirectly, certain classes of expenditure have positive values associated with them, 
such as stafT expense, expenditure for emoluments, and funds available for discretionary 
investment. Therefore, managers of Grms, where ownership is separate horn control, will
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spend more than the cost-minimizing amount on certain inputs for vdiich they have a 
preference (Dor et al, 1997).
Research in expense pre&rence theory has focused particularly on regulated 6rms 
and commercial banks, because the non-pro6t-maximizing actions are most likely to be 
manifest under imperfect product market structure (Scott et al, 1988). For example, in 
the electric utilities industry, CEOs (managers) often maximize their own expected 
utility: this utility function contains a varied of goals such as health, security, power, 
prestige, influence, and the welfare of others (Mixon, 2001). Thus, utility-maximizing 
CEOs (managers) have incentives to increase the size and duration of all job-related 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary sources of income/utility (DeAlessi, 1974).
Evidence from Past Literature 
Many studies have been conducted to test the expense preference theory, especially in 
the banking industry and savings and loan industry. Hannan and Mavinga (1980) tested a 
model by using more detailed information on the dispersion of ownership and on other 
characteristics of a large number of individual banking firms. Consistent widi the 
implications of expense preference behavior, their study showed that manger-controlled 
banks spend more on items likely to be preferred by mangers than do owner-controlled 
banks in similar situations. Another study done by Carter and Stove (1991) examined the 
relationship between management ownership and compensation for a sample of saving 
and loan associations, vdiich had recently converted to stock organizations. While their 
study confirmed the other previous studies, which supported the convergence of interests 
hypothesis (management acts in the interests of the owners) and the entrenchment
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hypothesis (management acts in its own interest), the authors found that it is conditional 
on the magnitude of m aniem ent ownership in the Srm.
Outside the banking industry, Dor et al (1997) gathered evidence from the hospital 
industry. Some\\iiat different from the owner-manager relationship, the authors 
examined the relationship between contract managers and salaried managers. The 
authors explained that because contract managers must strive to improve Gnancial 
performance under threat that the board of trustees will terminate their contract, they have 
every incentive to employ the iiqmts at cost-minimizing levels. In other words, these 
managers are not likely to exhibit expense preference behavior, or at least, are less likely 
to exhibit such behavior than managers having more conventional incentives (Dor et al, 
1997). Although their test results showed that contract managers do not f^ppear to be cost 
minimizers, they tend to exhibit lower expense preference behavior than salaried 
managers.
Finally, a study done by Achampong and Zemedkun (1995) examined the role of 
managerial self-interest in the merger market The authors hypothesized that managers 
are apt to increase their own discretionary spending and reduce risk to their career, often 
at the expense of the firm 's shareholders. Therefore, by testing a total of 800 Grms over 
the decade of the 1980s and selecting manager-preferred cost variables (insider 
ownership ratio, retained earnings ratio, excess stafGng), the authors found that self- 
interest is a significant motivating factor in corporate managers' merger decisions 
(Achampong and Zemedkun, 1995).
As demonstrated in the literature, agency theory and expense pre&rence theory are 
similar in that the separation of ownership and management serves as the base of the
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conflict and that all individuals are assumed to choose actions that maximize their own 
personal wel6re. While agency theory focuses more on the external structure of the 
relationship between the agent and the principal, expense preference theory focuses more 
on the internal behavior and the actual decision making of the agent. The following 
section will provide some expense-preferred variables, which have been used in the 
previous studies.
Manaper-preferred Cost Items
In order to capture the expense preference behavior, difkrent measurements were
used in past literature. Following are some of the expenditure categories used in previous
literature. The first element of the preferred expenditure category is related to labor.
fagxMsioM This is an activity that offers positive rewards, since promotional
opportunities within a Gxed-sized Grm are limited. The incentive to expand staff not 
only is an indirect means to the attainment of salary, but it is a source of security, 
power, status, prestige, and professional achievements. (Williamson, 1963, p. 1034)
Many studies have measured this expenditure differently. For example, Williamson 
(1963) used estimated costs of general administrative and selling expenses as the 
measurement. In the manufacturing industry, Ferris et al (1998) examined the effect of 
long-term performance plans on managerial decision making and use labor costs, which 
can be signiGcantly controlled by management as one of the variables. Due to the lack of 
labor cost data the authors used the number of employees standardized by the value of the 
Grm's total assets. As discussed in the study, management that adopts long-term 
performance plans seeks to lower the labor costs associated with production through a 
reduction in the size of its workforce, hence increasing net income and higher proGt 
margin. Another study by Achampong and Zemedkun (1995) examined the role of
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managerial self-interest in the merger market. The authors used excess stafGng as one of
the manager-preferred cost items and calculated it as the ratio of salary expenditures to
total assets. Finally, Dor et al (1997) deGned labor costs (wz^es) as total labor expenses
on hospital staff divided by Gdl-time-equivalent employees.
The second element of the preferred expenditure category is related to perquisites.
Williamson (1963) used the term "emoluments," which is a broader concept than
perquisites, deGned as the following:
EmoZumewtr This refers to the GacGon of managerial salaries and perquisites that 
are dismeGonary. That is, emoluments represent rewards, which, if removed, would 
not cause the manager to seek other employment The management would normally 
prefer to take these emoluments as salary rather than Eis perquisites of ofGce since, 
taken as salary there are no restiicGons on Gie way in which they are spent, while, if 
withdrawn as corporate personal consumpGon (such as expense accounts, execuGve 
services, ofGce suites, etc.), there are speciGc limitaGons on the ways these can be 
eiyoyed. However, there are two consideraGons that make perquisites attracGve. 
First, for tax purposes it may be advantageous to withdraw some part of discreGonary 
funds as perquisites rather than salary. Second, perquisites are much less visible 
rewards to the management than salary and hence are less likely to provoke 
stockholder or labor dissaGsfacGon. (Williamson, 1963, p. 1035).
In order to measure emoluments, Williamson (1963) in his model disclosed that the 
Grm will absorb some amount of actual proGts as emoluments. The author indicated 
"proGts" as a source of discreGon and deGned discreGonary proGts as the difference 
between actual proGts and minimum proGts demanded. Although it was noted in the 
study that the Gndii^s and the evidence presented were clearly suggesGve rather than 
deGniGve, the study does suggest that reported proGts are reduced by absorbii^ some
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GacGon of actual proGts in executive salaries and possibly in perquisites of a variety of 
sorts.
Other than expansion of stafF and emoluments, menGoned by WilGams, Ferns et al
(1998), suggested that selling and general and administradve expenses are direcGy 
controllable by management, and therefore any proGtability can be driven by a reducGon 
in these expenses. The authors, however, failed to observe any evidence of improvement 
in total sales, total asset turnover or the management of long-term debt but did Gnd that 
management seeks to enhance the Grm's proGt margin by reducing the cost of goods 
sold. Also research & development and/or advertising expenses were examined as 
essential discreGonary expaises by the authors, although they found no evidence that 
managers reduced these expenses.
The following section will discuss agency theory research in Gie restaurant industry, 
will be introduced. In addiGon, some charactensGcs and agency relaGonships related to 
the small Grms will be discussed.
Agency Theory literature in the Restaurant Industry
Most of the irntial research done in the restaurant industry concerning agency theory 
focused on the Ganchisor (the principal) and the Ganchisee (the agent) relaGonship. As 
opposed to the resource scarcity argument that suggests that growth is the primary reason 
that Grms begin to Ganchise, some researchers (Brickley & Dark 1987; Lafontaine, 1992) 
posited that Ganchising eases agency problems and the associated monitoring costs of 
mulG-unit operaGons (Castrc^ovanni & JusGs, 2002). As noted by Combs and Ketchner
(1999), the advantage of Ganchising is that by transforming ouGet managers into owners.
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Ganchising induces Ganchisees to maximize outlet proGts and greatly reduces the need 
G)r direct monitoiii^ by the Ganchisor.
This research trend Gxiusing on the issue of %ency theory and Ganchising also 
appGes to die relaGonship between the owner and the manager in the unit level. As 
previously suggested, the relaGonship between managerial ownership as a form of 
incenGve and company performance of the restaurant has been one of the major issues 
that have been examined. For example, Kim (1998) examined the relaGonship of 
managerial ownership and Grm performance using 224 observaGons Gom 146 restaurant 
Grms between the penod of 1995 and 1996. Controlling for Grm size and Price/Eamings 
raGo and using various performance measures Gom asset uGlizaGon to stock return, the 
study found a signiGcant posiGve associaGon between managerial ownership and all of 
the proGtability and operating efficiency measures (Kim, 1998).
Deqoite the awareness of pubGcly traded mulG-chain restaurants, it is a generaHy 
accepted fact that the restaurant industry is stGl dominated by the smaH mom and pop 
restaurant Grms. However, mainly due to the lack of available data, the amount of 
research is limited. In deGning a "smaG Grm," there can be many deGniGons, but the 
U.S. Government Printing OfGce's (USGPO) designaGon for a smaU Grms is one with 
fewer than 500 employees. These Grms provide 53% of employment in the U.S., produce 
47% of total sales revenues, comprise over 95% of the total number of Grms, and are 
responsible for most of the employment growth in recent years (USGPO, 1996).
One of the distinct charactensGcs of smaG Grms is that most of these Grms are famüy 
businesses (Handlo", 1989) and as Fama and Jensen (1983) proposed, fannly- controGed 
businesses are expected to be more efGcient than professionaGy run Grms because the
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costs of monitoring are less in a 6mily-controUed Grm. However, on the other hand, as 
Ang et al (2000) discussed, owners of small Grms typically lack Gnancial sophisGcaGon 
and may not be capable of performing efGcient monitoring. In either case, it is obvious 
that this kature affects the company's performance and therefore will also be considered 
in this study.
Chapter Summary
This chapter examined the literature regardh% the organizaGon of the Grm and the 
basic agency relaGonships therein. AddiGonally, the behavior of managers was examined 
in the context of expense preference theory. Expense preference theory states that when 
there is a conflict between the manager and the owner, managers (depending on Goeir 
ownership share) will behave in a way (making manager-preferred decisions) that will 
increase their utility; this, in turn, will lead to a decrease in Grm value, as stated by 
agency theory.
Utilizing the agency theory and expense preference theory discussed in chapter two, 
chapter three will discuss the hypotheses to be tested and the variables used in those tests. 
AddiGonally, the next chzq)ter will detail the data sample and methodology employed.
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Introduction
Based upon the agency theory literature discussed in the previous chapter, this 
chapter will explain the data used and methodology employed to test die cost 
management preference of small restaurant Grms. The Grst part of the chapter will 
discuss the hypotheses to be tested. The next seCGon will describe in detail the 
methodology to be anployed. The data set used in this study will then be discussed, 
followed by an explanation of the variables used in the statistical tests.
Hypotheses Testing
The alternative hypotheses shown below will be tested. The results and hypotheses 
tested will provide in s is ts  as to whether the ownership level of primary owner, Amily- 
owned factor, and management type affect the size of sta% cost of doing business and 
overall proGtability o f a Grm.
Hi: The proGtability of a Grm is different among the groups depending on type of 
management, level of ownership by primary owner, and family-owned factor.
25
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HzA: Size of stafF is different among the groups dependh% on the type of 
management, level of ownership by primary owner and family-owned Actor.
HzB: Cost of doing business is difkrent among the groups depending on the type of 
management, level of ownership by primary owner and Amily-owned factor.
First, the above hypoGieses will be tested for a three-way intoaction efkcL If such 
an effect is found, the two-way interacGon or individual main effects will not be tested 
separately. However, if  thae  is no three-way interacGon efkct, two way interacGon and 
main effects will be tested. Hi hypothesis will be tested using multiple analysis of 
variance (MANOVA), which will be discussed in the next secGoiL H%A and Hza will be 
tested using three-way analysis of variance. As menGoned in the previous chapters, it is 
eaqiected that cost of doing business and size of stafF are smallest for Grms ^ ^ c h  are 100 
percent owned by primary single-family owners and when the manager is also the owner 
of the Grm.
The third and Arth hypotheses to be tested are the relaGonship between the dependent 
variables and Gie independent variables. This test will be conducted using mulGple 
regression, and the hypotheses are summarized as below:
Ha*: There is a negaGve linear relaGonship between size of stafF and the percentage of 
primary owner, management type and family-owned factor;
Hag: There is a negative linear relaGonship between cost of doing business and the 
percentage of primary owner, management type and family-owned factor;
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H#: There is a posiGve linear relaGonship between the dependent variables (ROE, 
ROA, ROS, Gnancial leverage, asset utilizaGon) and the independent variables 
(percentage of primary owner, management type and fannly-owned factor).
StatisGcal Methods Used 
In order to exanune the relaGonship of ownership structure and the variables 
discussed in the previous diapters, this study will use two different staGsGcal procedures. 
The multiple analysis o f variance test and ordinary least squares regression models are 
discussed in the fbUowing secGons.
Analysis of Variance Tests 
The analysis of variance test is used to examine the mean differences among the 
groiQ)s studied. Two difkrent kinds of mulGple analysis of variance tests, the three-way 
ANOVA test and the mulGvariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) wUl be used in this 
study. These tests will be used to determine whether type of management, Annly-owned 
Actor and ownership of primary owner of the Grm will have an efkct on the dependent 
variable(s). This design will make it possible to determine wheGier all three factors 
joindy affect the dependent variable(s) in some way. Compared to using a one-way 
ANOVA test and an independent t-test separately, this test will make it possible to 
examine the interacGon between all the factors that are to be considered. For example, 
according to agency theory and expense-prefisrence theory, it is expected that the cost of 
doing business will be the lowest for Grms when the primary owner owns 100 percent of 
the ownership, Wien the Grm is owned by a single Amily and also when the Grm is 
operated by the owner. However, running an independent t-test and a one-way ANOVA
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test will only examine these Aree factors separately. Conducting a mulGple analysis o f 
variance (three-way ANOVA / MANOVA) makes it possible to examine whether the 
relaGonship between the cost of doii% business and ownership percent%e is affected by 
Gie type of management and family-owned factor. The three factors to considered in the 
test are management type (owner-man^er Grm/outside manager Grm), family-owned 
Actor (single family owns more than 50 percent of Grm/less than 50 percent of Grm) and 
ownership perc^tEge (primary owner owns 100 percent of Grm/more than 50 
percent/owns 50 percent/less than 50 percent).
Figure 1 shows the research model used in this study. In addiGon, the number of 
sources of variance in the variance test is eight, and the e i^ t sources of variaGons are 
shown in Figure 2.
Cost of Doing 
Business
Size of Staff
Five Accounting 
RaGos
Dependent Variables
Management Type
Ownership Percent 
by Primary Owner
Family-owned
Factor
Independent Variables
Figure 1. RelaGonship of dependent variables and independent variables.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
MANAGEMENT TYPE (A)
FAMILY OWNERSHIP (B)
OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE (C)
t Main Effects
—  First Order InteracGons
IMANAGEMENT TYPExFAMILY OWNERSHIP 
MANAGEMENT TYPExOWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE 
FAMILY OWNERSmPxOWNERSmP PERCENTAGE 
MANAGEMENT TYPExFAMILY OWNERSHIPxOWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE 
WITHIN CELLS (ERROR)
Figure 2. Sources of variance.
As discussed earlier, the main effects, Which are management type, family and 
ownership, will be tested to determine if the underlying populaGon level means are 
difkrent for the factors under consideraGon. The interacGon effect, deGned as a joint 
efkct of the independent variables, is assessed by examining the pattern of means for the 
two Actors combined. Finally, the three-way interacGon examines whether the patterns 
of means for any two factors difkrs across the levels of the third factor (Stevens, 1999).
The major difference between three-way ANOVA and MANOVA depends on the 
number of dependent vanables and their correlaGon. Compared to using a univariate test 
(in this case, three-way ANOVA) for each individual dependent variable, this test wiU 
make it possible to examine the interacGon between all the independent factors which 
need to be considered and will also reGect any correlaGons among the dependent
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vanables, The reason Giat MANOVA is preferable to such separate univariate analysis 
was summarized by Stevens (1999) as foGows:
1) The univariate analyses, cspeciaGy for a moderate or large number of dependent 
variables, aGow the overaG type one error rate to go completely out of control;
2) The univariate ANOVA ignores important inArmation, such as the correlations 
among the dependent measures, Wiereas the multivariate tests incorporate these 
correlations into the test;
3) The univariate tests many not show the groups to be signiGcanGy different on any 
of the variables, because of smaG unreliable differences on each of the variables. 
However, if measures are considered joindy (as in MANOVA), there may be 
signiGcant differences; and,
4) If treatment affects the dependent variables in difkient ways, and the dependent 
variables are at least moderately correlated within groiqis, the m u lti\^a te  approach 
will be quite powerGil and can detect differences that the univariate tests cannot
In order to determine whether there is a signiGcant correlation among the dependent 
variables, Bartelett's test far sphericity wiG be used. As noted by Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham and Black (1995), this test is the most widely used test to examine the correlation 
among aG dependent variables and make it possible to detect any signiGcant correlation 
among the variables. However, a common problem encountered in using MANOVA is 
the tendency of including aG dependent variables without a sound conceptual or 
theoretical basis (Hair et al., 1995). This indicates the problem of including one of the 
dependent variables without a solid rationale and then drawing incorrect conclusions 
about the set as a whole. It is for this reason that two variance tests (three-way ANOVA 
and MANOVA) are conducted separately in this research. The dependent variables (size 
of staff" and cost of doing business) wGl be tested by the three-way ANOVA test. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
remainder of the Gve dependent variables, which mainly represent the proGtabGity of the 
Grm, will be tested by using MANOVA.
Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
In order to identify the degree of impact of ownership structure, a multq)le regression 
model WU be employed. For each dependent variable, independent variable(s), which 
are ownership percentage of pim ary owner, management type and family-owned Actor, 
will be used to examine the reAGonship. Management type and family-owned Actor will 
be recoded into 0 or 1 for use in the regression model. By employing a regression model, 
the signiGcance and the signs of the independent variables can be tested.
DaA Source and Sample CollecGon 
The Gnancial data used in Giis study were obtained Gom The 1998 Survey of 
Small Business Finances (SSBF), formerly known as the NaGonal Survey of Small 
Business Finances (NSSBF), which is conducted by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (FRS) with the help of the NaGonal Opinion Research Center 
(NORC) at the University of Chicago. The 1998 survey is Gie third time that Gnancial 
inArmaGon Ar businesses with Awer than 500 employees has been coUected by the FRS 
and are Ae most recendy available data. The survey method was a 40-minute telephone 
interview conducted Gom November 1998 through January 2001. The iniGal sample 
includes 3,561 Grms that represent ^proximalely 5 million small nonArm, nonGnancial 
business operating m Ae U.S. wiA completed mterviews (response rate 33%) of Ae 
survey.
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Among these samples, this study will use Ae data of the eating and drinking Grms 
classiGed by primary SIC code 58 (Eating and Drinking places), Which results m 171 
Grms. The sample includes Gnancial data Ar Aese non-publicly-traded companies Ar 
Gscal year 1998.
Among these 171 Grms, 56 Grms Wiich are sole proprietorships and 25 Grms which 
are partnerships, LLPs, or LLCs were excluded Gom Ae data seL This exclusion is due 
A the fact that most sole proprietorships and partnerships diGer in terms of tax issues 
and/or liabiGGes compared A corporaGons. A  addiGon, three samples that did not have a 
value Ar the tested variables were eliminated. Thus, the Gnal data set Ataled 87 Grms.
Measurement o f Variables 
Expansion of Staff
As examined m the expense-preference theory and agency theory, excess use of stafT 
is one of Ae most important variables over which managers have direct control. 
According A Ae data, when the primary owner owns 100 percent of the Grm, sales per 
employee raGo shows that Grms operated by owner-manger Grms are higher than Grms 
managed by outside-manager Grms are. A  addiGon, as Ae level of ownersAp decreased, 
sales per employee raGo decreased. This result agrees wiA agency theory and expense 
preArence Aeory, as discussed A chapter two. AlAough many ways have been 
suggested A measure this vanable m Ae Gterature, due A Ae availability of Ae data, this 
study will use Ae number of employees standardized by Ae value of the Grm's total 
assets.
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Cost of Dome Business 
Operating expenses, selling, and general and administrative expenses have been 
mentioned in previous studies as directly controllable by management As noted earlier, 
excessive expense on perquisites and other nonessentials incurred by managers should be 
reflected in this variable. In Figure 3, it can be seen that the average expense-to-saies 
ratio for the samples are much higher for the sample firms operated by outside-managers 
compared to owner-managers. Also, the ratio is higher for Grms when the primary owner 
has less than 100 percent of the ownership. These two Ggures in Figure 3 indicate that 
there is a relationship between the type of ownership and the level of ownership with the 
cost of doing business. Due to the availability of the data, the total cost of doing business 
to the annual sales ratio will be used. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the total cost of doing 
business is the sum of "cost of goods sold" and "selling and administrative expenses."
1.0
I
§
0 « w r Manager
Z  jK
Type of Manager
100% L s s  then 100%
% of ownership by primary ow ner
Figure 3. Cost of doing business to sales ratio by ownership structure for a sample of 87 
small corporations.
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Accountme Ratios
Some of the previously used accounting ratios, such as return on equity (ROE) and 
return on assets (ROA), will also be used to compare the proGtability o f the sample 
companies. However, this use raise the quesGon of whether or not these raGos direcGy 
reGect the managerial spending behavior associated with agency theory. For example, an 
increase in ROE can result from either a singular or a combined increase in Gie ROA, 
earnings leverage or capital structure leverage (Ingram, 1994). Also, proGt margin is net 
income divided by revenue, which means that either increasing sales, or reducing costs, 
or a combinaGon of these two will have an efkct on the raGo. It cannot be assumed that 
Gns raGo itself direcGy reGects the underlying behavioral assumpGon involved in the 
agency theory. Therefore, in order to test the decision-making process, Giese raGos wiU 
be decomposed as follows:
Kefwn on assets (RCM). ROA is an indicator of proGtability, which is determined by 
dividing net income G)r the past 12 months by total average assets. The result is shown 
as a percentage. ROA can be decomposed into return on sales (net income/sales) 
mulGplied by asset utilizaGon (sales/assets).
on egmty ROE is an indicator of proGtability, which is determined by
dividing net income for the past 12 months by common stockholder equity (ar^usted for 
stock splits). The result is shown as a percentage. Investors use ROE as a measure of 
how a company is using its money. ROE may be decomposed into ROA mulGplied by 
Gnancial leverage (total assets/total equity).
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ChfgAer Summary
This chapter has presented the hypo&eses to be tested in this study and the sources of 
data. This research uses a sample of 87 small restaurant Grms and utilizes MANOVA 
and regression models to test the Garegoing hypotheses. The chapter also explained how 
the key variables were to be rationalized. The next chrqrter will discuss the results of the 
StatisGcal tests.
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This chapter will present the results o f the statistical methods enployed and analyze 
them. This chapter is organized as G)llows. The first section presents descriptive 
statistics 6 r  the sample. The next sections will present the results of the three way 
ANOVA, MANOVA and multiple regression models. Conclusions are discussed at the 
end of the chapter.
Descriptive Analysis
In order to better assess the data, a descriptive analysis of the 87 Grms was conducted. 
The descripGve staGsGcs were based on attributes related to the Grm, size o f staff and 
operaGon variables such as revenues and expenses.
Firm-related
According to Table 1 and the Gequency test for the sangles, the distribuGon of the 
samples regarding the Grm's age were normal, ranging Gom one year to 55 years. 
Although over 60 percent of the Grms in the study have been in business for 15 years or 
less, 16 of the Grms had been in business over 25 years. Among these 16 Grms, 14 Grms 
are family-owned businesses, indicating one of the m^or charactensGcs of successful
36
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small confiâmes. As mentioned in previous ckqiters, the majority of the Grms (67 
Grms) in this study are owned and managed by the same person (owner-manager Grms) 
while 20 Grms are managed by a paid manager (outside-manager Grm).
Table 1 Firm-related DescripGve StaGsGcs for 87 Small Restaurant Firms
No. Firms Minimum Maximum Mean Std.DeviaGon
Owner expenenoe 87 2.00 54.00 20.9655 11.51384
Age of Grm in years 87 1.00 55.00 15.3563 11.18655
Ownership share of 
principal owner 87 10.00 100.00 672414 27.04603
StAff-related
As shown in Table 2, the number of working owners ranged from 0 to 5, compared to 
the range of the actual owners which ranged Gom 1 to 60. It should be noted, however, 
that the number of working owners does not necessarily indicate the number of working 
pn/Mory owners. As menGoned in chapter one, the primary owner is deGned as an owner 
who has the largest ownership share and Gdl Gnancial decision-making authonty. 
Therefare, it should be noted that the type of management (owner-manager or outside- 
manager) used throughout this research is based on primary owners and not actual 
owners or working owners. Finally, the number of non-owner employees ranged Gom 0 
to 450, where the mean value was approximately 55.
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Table 2 StaG-related DescripGve StaGsGcs for 87 SmaU Restaurant Firms
No. Firms Minimum Maximum Mean Std.DeviaGon
Number of woddng owners 87 .00 5.00 1.4253 .78699
Number of non-owner 
Employees 87 .00 450.00 55.2184 73.48254
Number of owners 87 1.00 60.00 2.8621 6.49181
OperaGon-related
The variables were distributed normally except Gr two outliers. As can be seen from 
Table 3, total sales far the current year ranged Gom zg^iroximately $40,000 to $32 
million. However, one Grm had more than $32 milGon in sales and the remainders were 
all below $10 mdlion. This Grm also reported an approximate $32 milGon in the cost of 
doing business, while die rest of the Grms ranged Gnm $40,000 to $9 million. The 
discussion of outliers that were eliminated will be described in the next secGon. The 
reported proGt variable ranged Gom negaGve one million dollars through approximately 
1.9 million doUars. Among the 87 Grms examined, 12 Grms had reported a negaGve 
proGt and only one Grm reported a 1.9 million dollar proGt. The m ^onty of the Grms 
reported proGts o f less than one milGon. Also, it was found Giat among the 13 Grms 
which reported a negaGve proGt for the current Gscal year, six Grms were start-up 
businesses in just then Grst or second year of business.
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Table 3 OperaGon-related DescripGve StaGsGcs 6)r 87 Small Restaurant Firms
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. DeviaGon
Reported equity 87 -2,556,996 8,283,072 274,266 1,137,593
Total sales 87 40,857 32,811262 1,949,004 3,810,328
Total cost of doing 
Business 87 40,000 32,197,013 1,775,556 3,763,617
Reported proGt 87 -1,578,199 1,965,604 191,137 358,527
Total assets 87 11,500 11,736,077 659,970 1,407,075
Total liabiGGes 87 0 3,870,179 385,704 633,161
Note: Amounts presented in dollars.
Analysis and ImpGcaGons 
Agency Cost and Ownership Structure 
After conducting an assumpGon check for the samples, an ANOVA test was 
conducted. As menGoned in chzqiter three, the three factors which were considered in the 
test were type of management (MGMT), percentage of ownership (OWNERSHIP) and 
Gmnly-owned factor (FAMILY). A total of 87 Grms were examined. The test was 
conducted twice including and excluding the outher menGoned in Gie previous secGon. 
Although the outlier inGuenced the mean value, it did not change the result of the 
signiGcance tests. Therefore, the outUers are included in the Gnal result. It should be 
noted that the major focus is the case where the primary owner (single &mily) owns 100 
percent of the Grm and also operates the Grm. As discussed earlier, the true existence of 
agency costs can be detected compared to this case, where there is theoreGcally no 
agency cosL
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In order to determine whether the dependent variables were correlated, Bartelett's test 
for sphericity was used. According to the test, Gve dependent variables ROE, ROA,
ROS, Gnancial leverage, and asset utilizaGon, which mainly represents proGtabiGty, did 
show a signiGcant degree of intercorrelaGon (p<0.001), as expected. There&re, it is 
reasonable to conclude that these Gve dependent variables can be examined using 
MANOVA.
Table 4 shows the results of the MANOVA test for proGtabiGty. The interacGon 
efkct should be tested before examining the main e fk c t As can be seen Gom Table 4 
there is a signiGcant interacGon efkct between MGMT and OWNERSHIP and between 
FAMILY and OWNERSHIP.
FXMZLT aW  AA3MT According to Table 4, although there is no overall signiGcant 
interacGon between the FAMILY and MGMT factor, ROE does show a signiGcant 
difkrence between these two factors. This result means that although these two factors do 
not afkct the overaU proGtabiGty measurements which were tested, it does have an efkct 
on ROE. Figure 4 confirms this conclusion. Whether the Grm was an owner-manager 
Grm or an outside-manager Grm, ROE was higher for single-family-owned Grms than for 
non-single-famdy owned Grms. A quesGon arises, that when examining within the 
single-kmily Grms only, outside-manager Grms had a higher ROE than owner-manager 
Grms, which is an opposite finding to what was predicted. This result might be due to 
sampling error or the fact that measurement of equity could be problemaGc. The sample 
included negaGve equity numbers, which could be signiGcanGy different Gom posiGve 
ROE Ggures.
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Table 4 MANOVA Summary Table: Interaction ESect
MANOVA
Source of variaGon
. Degrees of Approx. F
Value
 ̂ TT . . . Between WiGiin MulGvanate Umvanate groiq) group
Sig.
FAMILY/MGMT 0.121 1.928 5 70 0.101
ROE 5.763 0.019**
ROA 0232 0.632
ROS 2.051 0.156
Financial leverage 0.300 0.585
Asset uGlizaGon 2.025 0.159
MGMT/OWNERSHIP 0.227 3.271 5 72 0.010***
ROE 2.153 0.101
ROA 1.064 0.370
ROS 2.471 0.000***
Financial leverage 0277 0.842
Asset UtilizaGon 1.194 0.318
FAMILY / OWNERSHIP 0.455 4.179 10 142 0.000***
ROE 0.610 0.546
ROA 0.120 0.887
ROS 2.112 0.128
Financial leverage 14.062 0.000***
Asset UtilizaGon 0.593 0.555
Note. The test is based on Pillai's Trace, which is genera).; used when sample size 
decreases, unequal cell size appears, or homogeneity o f covariance is violated (Hair et al., 
1995).
MGMT = Type of management factor; FAME Y = Owned by single family factor; 
OWNERSinP = Percentage of ownership 6 ctor.
**SigniGcant at 95%; ***SigniGcant at 99%.
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Figure 4 Mean score of ROE by management type and family-owned &ctor.
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shows that there is a significant difkrence in proût margin, depending on the level of 
ownership percentage and management type; Figure 5 shows this relationship. As can be 
seen 6om the Figure 5, the proGt margin decreases as the level of ownership decreases 
with owner-manager firms. However, this jGnding is not same for outside-manager Gims. 
Comparing only the case where primary owner owns 100 percent of the Grm, ROS is 
higher for owner-manager Grms than for outside-manager Grms and the opposite when 
ownership is less than 50 percent
FXMZLF awf OlfWEÆSHZP The second interacGon effect found was between 
FAMILY and OWNERSHIP factors, which signiGcanGy affect Gnancial leverage. As 
menGoned in chuter three, this variable is measured by total assets divided by total 
equity. Results indicate that Gnancial leverage for single-family Grms and non-single­
family Grms is different depending on the level of ownership. As it can be seen Gom
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ûgure 6, there were no Grms that were 100 percent owned by primary owner which were 
non-single-hamily-owned Grms. When Gwusing only on the single-fiamily-owned case, it 
can be seen that as the ownership percentage decreases, Gnancial leverage also decreases.
. s
. 3
.2
1
0.0
»r «  SOOw
Ow n«r-manas«>r 
C H jt s k l^ - r r a a r u a g ^ r
Figure 5 Mean score of ROS by management type and ownership percentage.
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Figure 6 Mean score o f Gnancial leverage by family-owned factor and ownership 
percentage.
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Table 5 shows the results of the three-way ANOVA test The Grst item that should be 
examined is whether an interaction exists among the diree 6 ctors discussed. As 
discussed in chapter three, one cannot effectively assess the individual &ctors, unless it 
can be confirmed that there is no interaction among the factors beh% discussed.
Table 5 Results of Three-way ANOVA Test
Mean
Square F Sig.
Dependent Variable: Cost of Doing Business
FAMILY OWNERSHIP 1.021 1 1.021 9.947 .002***
OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE .985 3 .328 3.202 .028**
MANAGEMENT TYPE /
OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE " 283 2.754 .048**
Dependent Variable: Size of Staff
MANAGEMENT TYPE / ? n  op n? ? 
OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE
7.398E-
08 3.267 .026**
Notes: F AML Y = Owned by single family factor; OWNERSHIP = Percentage of
ownership &ctor; MGMT = Type of management 6 ctor; 
**SigniGcant at 95%, *** SigniGcant at 99%
Cost Doing Rufinass As can be seen Gom the top panel of Table 5, there is an 
interacGon between type of management (MGMT) and percentage of ownership 
(OWNERSHIP), which indicates that the relaGonship between cost of doing business and 
percentage of ownership is not the same for owner-managed Grms and outside managed 
Grms. Figure 7 confirms the existence of this interacGon eGect. Figure 7 shows that 
while the cost of doing business was lowest for owner-managed Grms when the manager 
owned 100 percent of the Grm, this was not true for outside-manager firms. The cost of
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doing business was higher &r Grms when the primary owner owned 100 percent of the 
Grm than Grms when the primary owner owned less than 100 percent of the Grm. On the 
other hand, no interacGon was detected between FAMILY and MGMT or FAMILY and 
OWNERSHIP. The FAMILY Gictor was signiGcant at the 99 percent level, indicating 
that this 6 ctor is a main efGsct and that it is possible to rqect the null hypothesis diat cost 
of doing business is the same for the difkrent groups in the factors. Figure 8 shows that 
the main efkct of FAMILY does not have any interacGon, depending on the level of 
ownership. This result leads support to the noGon that as the level of ownership by 
primary owner decreases, cost of doing business wras signiGcanGy higher for non-siogle 
Amily Grms than for single family owned Grms at all levels o f ownership.
-1 .2  «
e •
f i r m
- t o o
Figure 7 Mean score of cost of doii% business by type of management and ownership 
percentage.
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Figure 8 Mean score of cost of doing business by family owned factor and ownership 
percentage.
Ŝ izg q / " S i z e  of staff is a variable which was tested based on the expense- 
preference theory. As discussed in chapter three, the size of staff is one of die variables 
over which managers are assumed to have direct control. Table 5 indicated that there is 
an interaction efGxt from the two Actors which are MGMT and OWNERSHIP. Figure 9 
conGrms this interaction efkcL While the mean score for size of staff increases Ar 
owner-manager Grms, when the level of ownership decreases, it is somewhat the opposite 
for outside-manger Grms. However, comparing the two extreme cases for the two types 
of manager Grms, it can be seen that size of staff was signiGcantly higher for outside- 
manager Grms than for owner-manger Grms when the primary owner owned 100 percent 
of die Grm.
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Figure 9 Mean score of size o f stafTby management type and ownership percentage.
Degree of Agency Cost and Ownership Structure 
In this section, &e results of a regression test for each variable are shown. As 
discussed earlier, ordinary least square regression will be used to determine the 
coefBcient of the independent variables.
Cost q^Domg Business. Table 6 shows the result of the regression for the variable
cost of doing business. First, the FAMILY factor, vdiich was previously identiûed as a 
main efkct, was signiScant at 99 percent, indicatii^ that this factor is independently 
explaining the variance o f the variable being tested. The coefBcient of the FAMILY 
variable is -0.474, indicating that the mean cost of doing business decreases an average 
by 0.474 dollars when the Grm is a single-family-owned firm compared to a non-single- 
6 mily-owned Grm. Although OWNERSHIP and MGMT &ctors were also signiGcant, 
these factors will not be interpreted separately. Instead, the combined factor, which is the 
MGMT / OWNERSHIP variable shows that cost of doing business decreases by -0.763 
dollars for owner-manager firms as the percentage of ownership by the primary owner 
increases.
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Table 6 Regression for Cost of Doing Business
Model
Unstandardized 
CoeKcients 
B Std. Error
Standardized
CoefGcients
Beta
T Sig.
OWNERSHIP 7.786E-03 .003 .562 2.568 .012**
FAMILY OWNERSHIP -.440 .103 -.474 -4.267 .000***
MGMT .525 232 .600 2261 .026**
MGMT*OWNERSmP -7.663E-03 .003 -.763 -2.431 .017**
R Square = 0.47 Adjusted R Square = 0JZ2
OWNERSHIP = Percentage of ownership factor; FAMILY = Owned by single family 
6 ctor; MGMT = Type of management factor.
**SigniGcant at 95%; ***SigniGcant at 99%.
Bize q / " I n  Table 7, the regression result for size of stafF showed a 
significance level of 95 percent for the MGMT*OWNERSHIP 6 ctor. This interaction 
was detected Gom the previous analysis of variance test. It is conGrmed here that this 
interacGon eSect does the job of expia wng the dependent variable. It can be concluded 
that the mean size of staff will decrease by -0.698 for owner-manager Grms as the 
ownership level increases. This makes sense as owners with more ownership level will 
hire fewer staff
Rgfum on Equity Table 8 conGrms the previous result of the MANOVA
test, showing that no interacGon efkct exists among the independent factors. However, it 
was found Gom this regression test that the family Gictor is signiGcant in explaining 
ROE. According to the beta, it can be said that the mean ROE is higher by 0.448 for 
single-family-owned Grms compared to non-single-family owned Grms.
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Table 7 Regression 6)r Size of StafF
Model
Unstandardized 
CoefGcients 
B Std. Error
Standardized
Coe&cients
Beta
t Sig.
OWNERSHIP 1.963E-06 .000 .346 1.440 .154
FAMILY -1.183E-07 .000 .000 -.003 .998
MGMT 1.581E-04 .000 .440 1.514 .134
MGMT / OWNERSHIP -2.877E-06 .000 -.698 -2.030 .046**
R Square = 0.06 Ac^usted R Square = 0.01.
MGMT = Type of management factor; FAMILY = Owned by single-family factor; 
OWNERSHIP = Percentage of ownership Gictor.
**SigniGcant at 95%.
Table 8 Regression for Return on Equity
Model
Unstandardized 
CoefGcients 
B Std. Error
Standardized
CoefGcients
Beta
t Sig.
OWNERSHIP 4.386E-03 .013 .046 .346 .730
FAMILY 2.843 1376 .448 2.067 .042**
MGMT 2.025 1.375 .338 1.472 .145
MGMT/FAMILY -2.769 1.534 -.53H -1.805 .075
R Square = 0.06 Actuated R Square = 0.009.
OWNERSHIP = Percentage of ownership factor; FAMILY = Owned by single-fiamily 
factor; MGMT = Type of management &ctor.
** SigniGcant at 95%.
Rerum 0» A s f e t s A n o t h e r  indicator of proGtability is ROA As in the 
previous MANOVA test, the regression test also did not show any signiGcant interaction 
eGect. However, using only ROA as the dependent variable, the regression resulted in a 
signiGcant main effect for family factor. The result shows that mean ROA is higher by 
0.267 6)r single-family owned Grms compared to non-single-Gimily Grms.
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Table 9 Regression G)r Return on Assets (ROA)
Unstandardized Standardized 
Model CoefGcients CoefGcients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
OWNERSHIP -2320E-03 .004 -.091 -.638 .526
FAMILY .482 .236 .267 2.042 .045**
MGMT -.167 .215 -.100 -.775 .441
R Square = 0.07 A<^usted R Square = 0.019.
MGMT = Type of managanent factor; FAMILY = Owned by single-family Gictor; 
OWNERSHH* = Percentage o f ownership Gictor.
**SigniGcant at 95%.
Prq/if AAargin. ProGt Margin was one of the two variables to explain ROA 
Although Gom the MANOVA test an interacGon effect was detected between the 
OWNERSHIP and MGMT 6 ctors, an interacGon effect was not detected in the 
regression test. This may be due to the fact that the regression model did not account for 
correlaGon among the dependent variables. However, the FAMILY factor was 
signiGcanGy different at 0.05 level with a posiGve beta. This result means that single- 
Ganily Grms will have a higher ROS compared to non-single-Gunily Grms, as predicted.
Table 10 Regression for ProGt Margin
Unstandardized Standardized 
Model CoefGcients CoefGcients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
OWNERSHIP -1.560E-03 .002 -.120 -.952 .344
FAMILY .390 .100 .447 3.913 .000**
MGMT -3.025E-02 .089 -.037 -.338 .736
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EfwmcW Zewemge = Tofo/ ArseiyToW Equ/fy. As confirmed Gom the previous 
MANOVA test, an interacGon effect between OWNERSHIP and FAMILY was detected 
to be signiGcant. In addiGon, the beta showed a posiGve sign which means that as 
ownership level increases, Gnancial leverage will increase for single-family-owned Grms 
compared to non-single-family-owned firms.
Table 11 Regression for Financial Leverage
Model
Unstandardized 
CoefGcients 
B Std. Error
Standardized
CoefGcients
Beta
t Sig.
OWNERSHIP -1.365E-02 .006 -1.047 -2.219 .029**
FAMILY -.169 .292 -.194 -.581 .563
MGMT -1.091E-02 .088 -.013 -.124 .902
OWNERSHIP/FAMILY 1.259E-02 .006 1.345 2.036 .045**
OWNERSHIP = Percentage of ownership factor; F AML Y = Owned by single family 
factor; MGMT = Type of management factor.
**Signi6cant at 95%.
Chapter Summary
First, given the results of three-way ANOVA, MANOVA and simple linear 
regression tests, the first two hypotheses tested can be accepted based on the test 
conducted. It was found that the level of ownership, management type, and family 
ownership yield signiGcant differences in cost of doing business and size of staff of the 
Grm. It was found that the size of staff decreased for owner-manager Grms as the level of 
ownership increased. For the cost of doing business vanable, a signiGcant difference was 
found between a single-family-owned Grm and a non-single-family-owned Grm.
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AddiGonally, the results conGrmed that as the level of ownership increased for owner- 
manager Grms, the cost of doing business decreased.
Second, among the overall proGtabihty variables measured by ROE, ROA ROS, 
asset utilizaGon and Gnancial leverage, only ROE, ROS and Gnancial leverage were 
shown to be signiGcanGy difkrent depending on level of ownership, family-owned factor 
and management type.
Third, Grom the regression tests, it was found that cost of doing business and size of 
stafF had negaGve linear relaGonships wiGi the three independent variables tested, as 
expected, therefore the two H3 null hypotheses are rejected. In addiGon, the regression 
test for the proGtability variables showed sigiGGcant relaGonships for Gie family-owned 
factor and the joint factor between ownersh^ and fanGly.
Overall, the results of Gie statisGcal tests tend to support the literature regarding 
agency theory and cost management preferences by Grms. The next chapter will provide 
Gnal conclusions and make recommendaGons for addiGonal research.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusion of the study 
The purpose of this p^per was to test cost management pre&rences of restaurant 
Grms. Based on Ae agency theory literatures, it was expected that costs are controUed 
diSerently by managers depending on the degree of conflict between the agent 
(managers) and the principal(s) (owners). The results of the statisGcal tests largely 
support the evidence in Gie existing literature.
The issue of "conflict of interest" based on agency theory has been a topic of interest 
for many researchers (Rozeff^ 1982; Kim & Sorensen, 1986; Morck et al., 1988; Hudson 
et al., Kim et aL, 1988' Hudson et aL, 1992; Gu & Qian, 1999) and has been applied to 
many industries. The mrgonty of these studies have tested the relaGonship between 
managerial ownership and conyany performance in order to determine whether agency 
relaGonship exists or no t This is different G?om the previous research in that it has 
attempted to identify the Grm-level cost variables that are assumed to be controlled 
diGerently by agents (managers) depending on their ownership structure. In oGier words, 
it was attempted to identify whether cost is controGed diGerenGy depending on the 
degree of conflict that exists between the agent (managers) and the principal (owners) in 
small restaurant Grms.
53
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In order to do so, this study used data Gom 87 non-publicly traded Grms (SIC code 58 
for restaurants) obtained Gom the Federal Reserve Board in then 1998 Survev of Small 
Business Finances. The use of this data made it possible to compare every level of 
ownership structure in which a Grm is 100 percent owned and managed by a single 
individual (no agency cost occurs) and in which a Grm is operated by a manager with no 
equity in the Grm.
Of the seven dqiendent variables analyzed (cost of doing business, size of sta% 
return on assets, return on equity, proGt margin, asset utilizaGon, and Gnancial leverage) 
the cost of doing business and size of staff were examined based on expense preference 
theory assuming that managers have the most direct control over these two variables. In 
addiGon, Gve accounting raGos GequenGy used to measure the proGtabihty of the Grm 
were selected. Indqiendent variables considered in the study were management type 
(owner-manager Grm versus outside-manger Grm), family ownership (a single family 
owns more than 50 percent of the Grm or less than 50 percent of the Grm) and ownership 
percentage (primary owner owns 100 percent of Gie Grm, primary ownisr owns more than 
50 percent but less than 100 percent, primary owner owns 50 percent of thp Grm, primary 
owner owns less than 50 percent).
The proGtabihty of the Grm variables represented in this study by ROE, ROA proGt 
margin, Gnancial leverage and asset uthizaGon, was tested using mulGple analysis of 
vanance (MANOVA). Among these vanables, it was found that ROE, proGt margin, and 
Gnancial leverage were signiGcanGy different depending on the independent factors.
First, it was found that ROE was higher for single family-owned Grms than non-single 
famhy-owned Grms as expected. Second, when the primary owner owns 100 percent of
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the Gim, ft wa ?  and that proGt margin was higher for owner-manager Grms than 
outside-manager Grms. Finally, it was found that as the ownership percentage decreases, 
Gnancial leverage also decreased within the single fmnily-owned Grms. Therefore there 
is some evidence to support the hypothesis that the proGtability of a Grm is difkrent 
depending on ownership structure.
According to the analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) that was used to compare the 
mean values of each group depœding on the ownership structure, it was found that cost 
of doing business was lowest for owner-managed Grms when the primary owner owned 
100 percent of the Grm. It was also found that as the level of ownership by primary 
owner decreases, cost of doing business was signiGcanGy higher for non-single 6m ily- 
owned Grms than single family-owned Grms at all levels of ownership percentage. In 
addiGon, when the primary owner owned 100 percent of the Grm, it was found that the 
size of staff was signiGcanGy higha" for outside-manger Grms than owner-manager Grms. 
This result tends to support the hypothesis that the cost of doing business and the size of 
staff are difkrent dqiending on ownership structure.
Ordinary least squares regression was used to test the signiGcance and the sign of the 
coefGcient of the independent variables that were tested. As expected, it was found that 
the cost of doing business is lower for single fannly-owned Grms compared to non-single 
fannly-owned Grms. It was also found that cost o f doing business is smaUer for owner- 
manager Grms as the percentage of ownership by the primary owner increases. For size 
of staff variable, it was found that the mean size of staG" decreased for owner-manager 
Grms as the ownership level increased.
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For the Gve dependent variables that were used to measure the overall proGtability, it 
was found that there was a posiGve linear relaGonship between all of the Gve vanables 
tested and the family-owned factor leading one to conclude that single family-owned 
Grms compared to non-single fanniy-owned Grms performed better in terms of 
proGtability.
RecommendaGons for Further Research
WhGe this study used two dependent variables (size of staff and cost of doing 
business) to examine whether or not cost is controlled differenüy depending on 
ownership structure, it would be more meaningful if the cost of doing business variable 
can be broken down into spedGc expenses. In GGs way it would be possible to examine 
which speciGc cost is more directly controllable for managers of different ownership 
structure. AddiGonally, the reader should be reminded that this study used only 
restaurant Grms. If data is available, it would be interesting to test different sectors (for 
example hotel, casino or others) within the industry or among other different industries.
Finally, while this study only considered the relaGonship between managers and 
owners, other agency problems which occur in différait relaGonships, such as lender and 
owner relaGonship, can also be examined. In addiGon, while this study mainly Gacused on 
problems such as moral hazard, other agency problems such as inkrmaGonal asymmetry 
could be examined.
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